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In recent years, there has been considerable controversy
over whether not-for-profit (NFP) and for-profit (FP) hospitals really
differ from each other in meaningful ways. Specifically, the ongoing
debate has concerned whether NFP hospitals pursue objectives that dif-
fer from the objectives of FP hospitals and, if so, whether these different
objectives get translated into different sorts of behaviors. Although it is
difficult to derive empirical support for hypothesized objective functions
of NFP hospitals (Pauly 1987a), some research studies have suggested
important substantive differences in the behavior of NFP and FP hospi-
tals. These findings include production of more costly and higher priced
care in FP hospitals (Gray 1986), better access in NFP hospitals (Gray
1986; Lee and Weisbrod 1977), more charity care in NFP hospitals (Gray
1986; Lewin, Eckels, and Miller 1988), and higher prices and profits in FP
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hospitals (Renn et al. 1985). Others have concluded that NFP hospitals
are less efficient than FP hospitals after adjustment for tax subsidies
(Herzlinger and Krasker 1987). Finally, some have reported that no
important differences exist between the two ownership types (Sloan and
Vraciu 1983).
This article is based on the argument that, whatever the research
shows about differences in the behavior of FP and NFP hospitals, NFP
hospitals-in order to justify the special treatment they receive, includ-
ing exemption from income and property taxes and the right to issue
tax-exempt bonds-ought to behave in a manner fundamentally differ-
ent from FP hospitals. Several states and localities are, in effect, taking
this normative position by challenging the traditional privileges enjoyed
by NFP hospitals in situations where the hospitals are not demonstrating
a sufficient social orientation in their behavior (Baldwin 1987; Nauert
et al. 1988).
At the outset, one might ask whether it is reasonable to expect NFP
hospitals to behave in a more socially oriented manner than FP hospitals
under increasingly constrained environmental circumstances. It has
been suggested that they are adopting and will have to continue to
adopt the behavior of FP hospitals, sacrificing nonfinancial goals to as-
sure financial viability (Jones, DuVal, and Lesparre 1987). The premise of
this article is that, in spite of economic pressures, managers of NFP
hospitals must ensure that significant differences continue to exist in the
behavior of NFP hospitals as compared to FP hospitals and, further, that
the communities these hospitals serve are clearly and accurately in-
formed of the differences. Abandonment of nonfinancial objectives
could well be a major step in the demise of the not-for-profit hospital
sector (Foster 1987). To fulfill their roles with accountability to the com-
munities they serve, and to justify their special treatment, managers of
NFP hospitals must use decision criteria somewhat different from those
of FP hospitals (Anthony and Herzlinger 1975).
This study addresses one decision that is important for all firms,
the capital expenditure (investment) decision. This decision is especially
critical to the NFP institution’s ability to meet both its service and its
financial objectives and, indeed, to its very survival in this era of re-
strictive prospective payment and increasing competition and rivalry.
The literature on capital expenditure decision making for not-for-profit
health care institutions has not reached a consensus on how these deci-
sions should be made. As this article will show, differences exist both in
the theoretical bases for decision criteria and in the technical decision
tools to employ.
We propose a normative decision model that explicitly recognizes
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the necessity of both fiscal soundness and the achievement of nonfinan-
cial objectives by NFP hospitals. Perspective on this issue is established
first by examining the historical and current role of not-for-profit hospi-
tals in society. This examination demonstrates the need to achieve nonfi-
nancial objectives and provides a clear theoretical foundation for the
model, something missing in much previous work. Before the invest-
ment decision-making model is presented, its context within the long-
range planning process is established. Then, the proposed project eval-
uation decision model is presented. The model recognizes nonfinancial
objectives while using standard tools of investment decision making.
Unlike many previous models, the model presented here explicitly as-
signs values to nonfinancial goals. Although the model uses a specific
definition of nonfinancial goals, it can easily be extended to other defini-
tions such as &dquo;community benefits&dquo; (Seay and Sigmond 1989). The long-
term planning and project evaluation methods also presented help to
clarify and expand the discussions of previous authors and can be used
by managers of not-for-profit hospitals to demonstrate the differences





In contrast to the purpose of for-profit firms, which is to maximize
the wealth of owners, the establishment of not-for-profit firms has often
been explained by certain characteristics of the output of the firm. Spe-
cifically, characteristics of the output necessitate the establishment of
nonprofit firms to remedy government or contract failure.
Weisbrod (1977, 1988) argues that the United States economy is
divided into three sectors: private for-profit, government or public, and
private nonprofit. The existence of both the public and the nonprofit
sectors stems from collective goods-those goods which by their natures
provide positive externalities or benefits to the community as a whole.
National defense and mosquito control are two traditional examples.
Inherent in these goods is the &dquo;free rider&dquo; problem-those who do not
pay can still consume the good. Therefore, private for-profit markets will
fail to provide these goods in sufficient quantity.2 2
Government often intervenes in the markets for these goods, with
financing compelled through taxation. Public programs that subsidize
people’s consumption of medical care services, such as Medicaid, are
examples of such intervention.3 However, government is limited by vari-
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ous factors, especially political ones, in its ability to correct these mar-
kets, and will provide only the amount demanded by the median or
mean voter (Weisbrod 1988). Nonprofit firms develop to satisfy the de-
mand for collective goods among individuals whose tastes for them are
above those of the median voter. Equity capital for these organizations is
supplied largely by donations.4 By providing collective goods that bene-
fit society but which both the private for-profit and the public sectors fail
to provide, the NFP firm represents a &dquo;quasi-governmental response to
forces that constrain the ability of democratic governments as political
institutions to satisfy consumer demands for collective goods.&dquo;5
Weisbrod’s theory provides historical reasons why NFP firms exist,
but it does not fully describe most NFP hospitals today. Modern NFP
hospitals are mixed commercial NFP and social good-providing organi-
zations, as Silvers and Kauer (1986) and Hansmann (1980, 1987) suggest.
They derive most of their revenues from sales of services to private
consumers, much as a for-profit firm does, while they also produce
social outputs in the form of charity care, other services sold below cost,
and unreimbursed medical research and education.
Some previous writers on the investment decision and the return
on equity requirements of NFP hospitals have focused on one or the
other aspect of this mixed social and commercial enterprise because of
differing theoretical perspectives or the absence of an organized the-
oretical basis. For example, with their broad definition of the benefits of
health care outputs, which is not based on economic or other behavioral
theory, Berman and Weeks (1982) and Herkimer (1978) implicitly liken
the entire NFP health care firm to a governmental entity. In their invest-
ment models, each output is treated as a social output because each
benefits patients by saving lives, restoring health, improving conven-
ience, and the like. In contrast, because Pauly (1986) assumes that donors
may require minimal return for their donations, and that the form of
these returns is more varied than just social outputs, in his world the
NFP firm is primarily a commercial firm subject to the opportunities and
constraints present in its local market. Social outputs play a relatively
minor role.6 6
Other previous work is based on Weisbrod’s theory, or other sim-
ilar theories, although the theoretical foundation is not presented. Silvers
and Kauer (1986) are more explicit than Conrad (1984) in incorporating
the dual nature of the firm in their analyses, if not in a formal capital
expenditure model. The capital enhancement role of for-profit firms,
capital preservation of NFPs, and the capital consumption role of gov-
ernment in Long’s (1982a, b) work are direct results of the types of
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outputs the firms produce. For example, government produces outputs
that the private sector will not undertake because capital preservation or
enhancement is not possible. Like Conrad, Long (1976) does not ex-
plicitly delve into the dual role of the NFP health care firm, but he does
incorporate both functions in at least one of his capital expenditure
models.
The structure of the modern NFP hospital has evolved to facilitate
the production of both commercial and social goods. As we show later,
the combination of two activities of the NFP hospital-one a private
commercial NFP activity, similar to that of a credit union, and the other a
quasi-governmental public sector activity-is central to the financial de-
cision-making process of this hybrid firm. Social good production is
facilitated through the establishment of a highly visible community re-
source that can serve as a vehicle for receiving and accumulating charita-
ble contributions, governmental subsidies, and volunteer effort for the
purpose of financing social activities. The NFP hospital may convert
these resources into social outputs in the same period as they are re-
ceived, or it may use the resources for social good production in later
periods. Further, the hospital may be able to supplement these financing
sources with profits from its commercial activities, where some of the
revenues from commercial activities also come from community
members. 
,
From a finance perspective, these community-provided financing
sources (donations, government subsidies, tax exemption, volunteer
effort, and profits), if not consumed during the period they are received,
provide equity financing for the NFP hospital. This equity financing is
analogous to the equity financing of for-profit firms, which takes the
form of common stock sales and retained earnings. And, as in the FP
case, the suppliers of equity financing to the NFP hospital require a
return on their money.7 Paying a return to capital suppliers ensures
future inflows of capital as well as satisfying previous capital suppliers.




All capital expenditure decision making must begin with the estab-
lishment of a long-range (three-to-five-year) financial plan based on the
long-range strategic plan. Cleverley (1986) has described the long-range
financial planning process in detail. Some aspects of the process are
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particularly important in the capital expenditure decision and therefore
require discussion here.
Foremost in the development of the financial plan is the establish-
ment of two targets: (1) the stock of assets needed to carry out the
hospital’s objectives for the future and (2) the target capital structure of
the firm as reflected by the dollar values of long-term debt and equity.
Planning begins by determining the magnitude of desired commercial
and social activities of the firm in the future and projecting the necessary
set of assets to carry out these activities. Determination of the mix of
social and commercial activities will depend on the overall mission of the
hospital and, as discussed later, on the sources of financing available for
these activities. The change in assets between the current and projected
balance sheets must be financed with a debt/equity mix that results in
the target capital structure. The principal determinant of the feasibility of
the long-range financial plan is the ability of the hospital to generate
sufficient equity to support the desired assets while holding to the target
financing ratio.
For planning purposes, the annual percentage change in the dollar
value of equity from operating and nonoperating sources is the mini-
mum return on equity (profit rate) required to create the retained earn-
ings necessary to finance the new assets. Along with the cost of debt
financing, it determines the discount rate to use in the capital expendi-
ture decision, as described later.
The profit rate achievable is affected by the market power of the
firm. If the NFP hospital possesses little market power, the target return
on equity may have to be revised downward. Or, if projects cannot
generate the required return on equity, the firm may have to adjust its
asset expansion plans downward. Financial planning is always an iter-
ative process. It may be necessary to revise programs, goals, or the
target capital structure if the required profit rate is not feasible due to
product market conditions.
The long-range financial plan is related to the adoption of indi-
vidual projects in two specific ways: (1) it provides a framework within
which to evaluate specific projects by explicitly stating the social and
commercial missions of the hospital; and (2) it reflects the evaluations of
specific projects by showing which ones the hospital intends to under-
take. In this sense, there is an iterative process between project assess-
ment and long-range financial plan development. Desired projects de-
termine the ideal asset structure. The returns on these desired projects,
and the availability of sources of financing, determine the feasibility of





In this section, a methodology for evaluating specific projects is
presented. Like the approaches proposed by Long (1976, 1982a, b), and
Conrad (1984), and the model implied by Silvers and Kauer (1986), it is
based on the wealth-maximizing net present value (NPV) criterion rec-
ommended by financial economists for for-profit commercial enter-
prises. However, the methodology also draws on the theory of the not-
for-profit firm, specifically the mixed social and commercial nature of the
NFP hospital, and formalizes the two roles in investment decision mak-
ing. In the model, both the commercial (cash) and social value created by
the NFP hospital are quantified. Investment models proposed pre-
viously by other authors have incorporated this dual nature only infor-
mally and qualitatively (Berman and Weeks 1982; Herkimer 1978), or
have not shown the effect of the roles on the components of the model in
detail (Long 1976, 1982a, 1982b; Conrad 1984).
Presented next is a general description of the model, followed by
detailed discussions of each model component and, finally, an elabora-
tion of the decision criteria for the types of projects the NFP firm evalu-
ates. The discussion focuses on decision situations in which a project can
be evaluated independently, rather than in competition with another
project. Extending the approach to the analysis of two or more mutually
exclusive projects is straightforward.
THE MODEL
As part of the annual capital budgeting process, each project j
consistent with the mission of the hospital should be evaluated accord-




where Ct = the net cash flow generated by project j in period t;
kw = the firm’s commercial project discount rate;
sot = the social output generated by project j in period t;
ks = the social rate of time preference for social outputs; and
UD = the value of unrestricted donations and donations for
charity care received in year 0.
The first term in Equation 1 is the net present value of cash flows (NPVj),
which is the heart of the capital expenditure analysis of the for-profit
firm. Projects having positive net present values increase the wealth of
the firm’s owners by increasing the monetary value of the firm. Many
NFP hospitals have begun to use this criterion to evaluate capital invest-
ment projects.
The second term is what most clearly distinguishes capital expendi-
ture decision making in the NFP hospital from that in the for-profit firm.
It represents an assessment of the net present social value (NPSV,) of the
investment received by suppliers of equity capital over the life of the
project and reflects the interaction of financing with investment in the
dual-purpose NFP firm. Note that in this model, unlike those of pre-
vious authors (Berman and Weeks 1982; Herkimer 1978), not all projects
must create social value; the NFP hospital may undertake some purely
commercial projects with social values of zero. The sum of the commer-
cial and the social values created by each project must equal or exceed
zero (Equations 1 and 2). To ensure the financial viability of the organiza-
tion, however, the sum of the NPV of cash flows from all projects
adopted in a given year, plus the value of unrestricted donations re-
ceived in that year, must equal zero (Equation 3).8 In addition, any pro-
ject affecting social value must affect it positively (Equation 4).
Cash Flows (Ct)
The process of valuing the cash flows of a project employs the same
methodology as is appropriate for the for-profit firm, as described thor-
oughly in standard corporate finance textbooks. Therefore, we do not
cover this process in any detail, but rather focus on how the results of
this process, in combination with the social value analysis described
previously, influence the capital expenditure decision.
As for the FP firm, the yearly net cash flows (C,) are the difference
between cash inflows and cash outflows each year resulting from project
adoption, where all cash flows are measured as differentials from the
current levels. The outflows are composed of the initial outlay at time
zero for the long-term assets of the project plus yearly operating out-
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flows, including expenditures for social good output. Among the in-
flows are reimbursements from third party payers, payments from indi-
vidual patients, and salvage values of replaced assets.
An important source of cash inflows for some projects involving
capital expenditures is funds donated for the specific purpose of financ-
ing the project. Such project-specific donations should be included
among the cash inflows generated by the project, if in fact these dona-
tions would not be flowing to the firm in the absence of the project. This
approach, which differs from that proposed by Long (1982a, 1982b),
treats restricted donations as a form of revenues generated by the pro-
ject, rather than financing for the general purposes of the firm. Further,
it permits the NFP firm to adopt projects that generate no operating cash
inflows, as long as the necessary capital and operating funds are pro-
vided by donors and the project is consistent with the mission of the
firm.
Social Outputs (SOt)
Any project that produces social outputs must be evaluated to de-
termine its net present social value (NPSV), an estimate of the
magnitude of social value generated by the project. The social outputs
produced each year are quantified in the numerator of the second term
in Equation 1. In essence, equity capital suppliers receive dividends in
the form of social outputs produced by the firm that are valued by the
equity suppliers (donors and others).9 Suppliers of equity capital to the
NFP firm never get their initial capital returned in the form of cash.
Instead, they receive a return on or a return of equity over a finite or
infinite period in terms of in-kind dividends.
These in-kind dividends take the form of services with social value
to the community. Such services include charity care and other services,
such as medical research or education, that cannot or, for some reason,
do not pay their own way. Outputs sold to patients at a price equal to or
greater than the full cost of production are not social outputs. Similarly,
if the government purchases care directly for beneficiaries of a program
or supports research, the social output is created by the governmental
entity and not by the NFP hospital.10
As with the FP firm, the NFP firm may choose to forgo paying
dividends during a period. It may choose to earn profits, which are
retained by the firm to increase the stock of equity financing.’1 Retained
earnings permit the firm to generate greater levels of social value (divi-
dends) in future years. The ultimate return on equity in the NFP hospital
is the value of social goods produced in the current and future periods.
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The investment decision model discounts the dividends during the pe-
riod in which they are provided as part of the valuation process.
The method proposed in this article adopts a theory-based, yet
practical way to quantify social returns; it is an adaptation of the willing-
ness-to-pay approach to the valuation of social programs in a cost-benefit
analysis context. Our model contends that the value of the social outputs
in the numerator of the second term of Equation 1 depends on the
external benefits of the program to its financial supporters, which is
represented by what the community members (donors and other sup-
pliers of equity capital) are willing to pay for the services generated by a
particular project. 12
The practical problem that arises is in the estimation of community
willingness to pay. When a hospital project produces services to some
persons able to pay and to other persons unable to pay, the value of
services provided to paying persons is captured in the amount they
actually pay, provided that this amount is above some minimum that
might be established as the marginal cost of production. This value is a
commercial cash flow and should be included in the calculation of the
NPV of cash flows term. The value of services provided to patients who
cannot pay, which is the numerator of the NPSV term, can be estimated
by computing the average net price paid by those persons who are able
to pay. This approach is based on the crucial assumption that the amount
actually paid by paying patients is a fair representation of the value of the
services to the suppliers of equity capital to the firm. The validity of this
assumption must be considered in each particular evaluation. Four
points are worth including in such a consideration.
First, price is a fair measure of value only if one allows that the
payer has the capacity to judge the true value of the service in question.
Many observers of the health care system would disagree with this
proposition because of the informational asymmetry between the pro-
vider and the purchaser. Others would argue that for the majority of
health care services, the patient, in combination with his or her physi-
cian and third party payer, is reasonably well informed about the poten-
tial value of treatment decisions.
Second, the presence of insurance can result in price distortions
and the paying of a price in excess of that which one would be willing to
pay in the absence of insurance. Or, the existence of monopsony power
in the form of large third party payers can also result in the establish-
ment of a net price below the price that individual patients would be
willing to pay and one that is often below the full cost of production. 13
Third, the price paid will not represent the maximum price a per-
son would be willing to pay if the seller is unable to extract all of the
consumer surplus involved in the transaction. This assumption is not
477
particularly crucial. To the extent that it is not valid, the approach we
have suggested will provide a conservative estimate of the value of the
service.
Fourth, the amount a paying patient is willing to pay may be more
or less than the amount a donor or other equity supplier would be
willing to pay. Here, it is important to note that our suggested approach
embodies an explicit value judgment. We argue that, from the perspec-
tive of the community supporting the NFP hospital, the value of a ser-
vice provided to persons unable to pay is equal to the value of that same
service to persons having the means to pay. In this sense, we take an
egalitarian approach to the evaluation of social programs produced by
NFP firms. This approach has the danger of overvaluing social pro-
grams, with the resulting possibility that the firm will choose to adopt
programs with social value insufficient to justify their cash costs.
It is also possible that the project generates services that are solely
for social purposes, and not at all for commercial purposes. In such a
situation, the service has no paying patients, or at least no patients
paying a rate approximating a reasonable market price. The analysis may
be able to employ prices paid for the same service at another hospital in a
similar market circumstance. In this case, all of the caveats discussed in
the preceding paragraphs apply. But to these we would add the caution
about applying price in one market to value in another market.
To summarize, the suggested valuation method assigns monetary
value to the social services produced using an estimate of the price that
people would be willing to pay for the social services. The estimate of
this price should come from observation of the price paid by persons
with the means to pay, either for services from the subject hospital or
from a hospital in another market.
In the special case where the hospital has received donations made
for the specific purpose of supporting a proposed program, the estima-
tion of social value described above must be adjusted. The value of the
program to the donors is well represented by the amount of their dona-
tions. This value has already been included as a cash inflow of the
program. Therefore, the social value of the program must be net of the
dollar value of the restricted donations. Failure to make this adjustment
would result in double counting of the value of the project to contributors.
Discount Rate for Cash Flows (Kw)
The discount rate for calculating the net present value of cash flows
is the weighted average cost of debt and equity financing for the firm as
a whole if the project is adopted, or
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where
kw = the weighted average cost of capital;
Wd - the proportion of debt in the capital structure after the
project is adopted;
kd = the cost of debt;
we = the proportion of equity in the capital structure after the
project is adopted;
ke = k. (1 - T), the net cost of equity capital;
km = the risk-adjusted market rate of return; and
T = the marginal tax rate of donors.
Other authors have elaborated on the cost of debt thoroughly (Brealey
and Myers 1988; Copeland and Weston 1988). Here we elaborate on the
cost of equity financing.
The required cash and noncash return on equity capital for NFP
hospitals has been the subject of much debate (Silvers and Kauer 1986;
Conrad 1984, 1986; Pauly 1986). The concept of a return on capital merely
suggests that there is an opportunity cost when capital is used in one
way rather than in another.
NFP firms are typically started with donated funds. As discussed
previously, according to the social goods model, donors will contribute
to a NFP firm for one or both of two reasons. First, they will donate if the
firm pays out dividends in the current period in the form of social
outputs having a value at least equal to the cash value of the donation.
Or they will donate if the NFP firm provides dividends in future periods.
When this equity is used to generate cash flows, a commercial purpose
rather than the social purpose for which the equity was initially contrib-
uted, the firm must return the opportunity cost of those funds. Donors
must be assured that the initial donation will grow at least at such a rate
that its ability to purchase social dividends grows as fast as or more
rapidly than the donor would be able to achieve through the next best
alternative-the rate of return available in national financial markets after
taxes [k&dquo;~ (1 - T)) (Silvers and Kauer 1986; Long 1976; Conrad 1986). To
that we would add a risk adjustment as detailed in Wheeler and Smith
(1988).
This return must be earned whether the source of equity is dona-
tions or retained earnings. Retained earnings can be likened to capital
appreciation in the standard investment model. The amount added to
retained earnings in a given year is higher to the extent that dividends
are not paid in that year. The required return each period in that model is
based on the appreciated value of the investment. Thus, the tax-adjusted
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market-required rate of return is appropriately applied also to retained
earnings.14
The equity growth rate specified by the hospital’s long-range plan
may exceed the tax-adjusted market return rate in some instances. If so,
this planning-generated required rate of return should be used for ke
instead of the market return. However, it is critical to note that this rate
may be infeasible unless the NFP firm is very efficient, is subsidized by a
governmental unit, or has some monopoly power. If these conditions do
not exist, the long-range plan may have to be revised to a lower growth
rate. In other words, the market evaluation of the firm is that it should
not grow at its planned rate.
Social Discount Rate (ks)
The social discount rate is the equivalent of return on equity in the
for-profit firm except that the supplier of equity capital to the NFP firm
expects in-kind dividends in the form of social outputs in perpetuity.15
The dividends generated over the life of a project by the NFP hospital
must be discounted to the present time to show their value in today’s
dollars, which is the amount that donors would be willing to pay to
receive them. There is a well-developed literature on the appropriate
discount rate to use in evaluating social programs, dating back at least to
Marglin (1963) and Baumol (1968). This literature develops the debate
over whether the discount rate for social programs is different from the
discount rate for private investment decision making. The context of the
private NFP hospital is characterized by private financing of public
goods, so that the issue of the appropriate social discount rate is perhaps
even more complex than in the situation of public financing of a public
good. The issue can be satisfactorily resolved by employing the arbitrage
argument articulated by Silvers and Kauer (1986), Long (1976), and Conrad
(1986). If the NFP hospital does not return dividends at a rate at least
equal to the tax- and risk-adjusted return on the market portfolio, donors
are better off investing their dollars in the market portfolio and using the
proceeds to purchase social goods directly.
Pauly (1987b), in contrast, envisions a local market for donations
that is separate from the national capital markets. If his contention is
correct, the discount rate would be selected to reflect a localized social
rate of time preference, or it may vary with the supply and demand for
donations rather than the opportunity cost of the market return rate.
Pauly suggests correctly that empirical examination of return rates is a
logical next step in the debate. However, for purposes of capital expen-
diture analysis, we are persuaded by the arbitrage argument. Therefore,
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in calculating the present value of social programs, NFP firms ought to
use a risk- and tax-adjusted opportunity cost of capital as perceived by
the suppliers of equity capital.
PROJECT ADOPTION
OR REJECTION
The NFP hospital evaluates three general types of projects with the
model depicted in Equations 1-4: those that create only commercial
value, those that create both commercial and social value, and those that
create only social value. As discussed briefly now, the adoption criteria
differ somewhat according to the type of project.
Commercial Projects
In the modern NFP hospital, some projects create only commercial
value. Although other authors have recognized the dual nature of the
NFP hospital, purely commercial projects have been ignored. For dual
NFP firms, commercial projects with positive NPVs, as determined by
evaluating the first term of Equation 1, should be adopted, because their
cash rates of return exceed the discount rate. A project with a NPV of
zero will generate cash equivalent to the return on capital necessary to
satisfy capital suppliers and meet the long-range financial plan of the
firm. A project generating a positive net present value is, in effect, pro-
ducing a surplus equity (and cash) contribution, which may be used to
support other projects with social value. Both Long (1976) and Conrad
(1984) point out that social outputs cannot be produced unless a positive
cash return on equity is earned.
Mixed Projects
Some positive NPV projects will by their nature generate social
value in addition to cash (commercial) value. As with the commercial
projects, if these projects contribute non-negative NPVs to the firm, they
should be adopted. However, some of these projects will generate nega-
tive NPVs, especially because social output expenditures are cash out-
flows. In these cases, there are two further criteria for adoption.
First, if the social value of the project exceeds the negative NPV, or
cash cost, the project is a candidate for adoption. In this case, the project
is desirable because the aggregate value created is positive; that is, the
cost in value to the firm is less than the benefit in value given to the
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community in dividends. Projects that generate less social value than the
net present cash cost to the firm should be rejected. They use up more
value in the firm than they provide in value to the community. Note that
if ke is increased to reflect growth plans that exceed the market rate of
return, fewer commercial and social projects will be accepted because
fewer projects will satisfy the higher rate of return criterion.
The second criterion is shown in Equation 3; the constraint im-
posed on the adoption of &dquo;worthwhile&dquo; negative NPV projects is that the
aggregate net present value of all projects adopted in a single period
must be equal to zero. Thus, the adoption of any negative NPV project is
dependent upon the adoption of positive NPV projects during the same
planning period; that is, the firm will be able to adopt negative NPV
projects while achieving its target financing structure only if sufficient
excess cash is generated by positve NPV projects. Failure to adhere to
this constraint will mean that the firm will be financing community
dividends through sacrificing its ability to produce services (and divi-
dends) in the future.
An exception may occur when the NFP hospital knowingly ap-
proves a partially liquidating dividend (Long 1982a, b). When this oc-
curs, donors receive a return of their initial investment, as well as
dividends, in the form of in-kind services. Some part of the initial invest-
ment is returned in the sense that the equity in the firm is reduced
consciously by the decision to produce additional social outputs.
The constraint that the total NPV of all of the adopted projects
equals zero agrees with Long’s (1976) normative position that NFP firms
are capital preservers. It does require that some projects with high NPVs
subsidize some projects generating social value but little cash value. But
this is different from requiring that each project earn sufficiently high
return to provide funds for social outputs.
Hence, the essence of the NFP hospital lies in its facilitation of
cross-subsidization (through donations, which transfer wealth, and
through commercial projects) both to support the provision of services
to persons who cannot pay and to support the production of services
that, in a strict market sense, cannot pay their own way.
Social Projects
Finally, a few projects may create no cash value at all. As with the
mixed projects, they should be adopted only if sufficient positive NPV is
created by the commercial or mixed projects so that Equation 3 is satis-
fied. In this way, capital is preserved, not consumed.
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DISCUSSION
The capital expenditure/investment model developed in this article
demonstrates that investment and financing are not separate decisions
when the NFP hospital produces both commercial and social outputs.
Both the cash and social value of investments are quantified in the
model, which is derived from economic theories regarding the role of
NFP firms and valuation of social outputs. The model differs from pre-
vious discussions of capital expenditure decisions in its theoretical basis,
its explicit valuation of social outputs, and the interaction of investment
and financing when donations are the source of financing. We also show
its link to the long-range financial planning process.
As is demonstrated by the model, social outputs can be precisely
defined and must be valued and reported to the equity capital suppliers
and the public if NFP hospitals are to demonstrate their &dquo;worthiness&dquo; of
the special tax treatment they receive. Further, it will harm the retention
of these benefits to claim that the benefits of NFP hospitals cannot be
quantified (Jones, DuVal, and Lesparre 1987) or that every output pro-
duced by NFP hospitals is a social output (Berman and Weeks 1982). By
employing the model developed here, managers of NFP hospitals can
ensure their pursuit of missions different from those of FP hospitals and
can demonstrate quantitatively the differences to the communities they
serve. The model is generalizable to broader definitions of social out-
puts, such as community benefits but, again, we caution against im-
precise or all-encompassing definitions of these outputs.
Implicit in this proposed methodology is the process of cross-sub-
sidization. Cross-subsidization within an institution consists of support-
ing losses on those services that generate negative cash returns, with the
profits on those services with positive cash returns or with donations. In
economic terms, it is a transfer of wealth from those paying for the
positive-return services to those receiving and perhaps paying for the
negative-return services. The production of negative NPV services is
basic to the existence of tax-exempt nonprofits-to facilitate the provi-
sion of services to the community that would not otherwise be provided.
The board, in making strategic decisions, is faced with the constraint
that the positive-return services support the negative-return services, or
that the returns sum to zero. The board’s fiduciary duty to preserve the
assets of the organization requires that this overall NPV not be less than
zero.
The expansion of case-based prospective payment and of dis-
counted prices negotiated with some purchasers of care in which no
return on equity is allowed has substantially limited hospitals’ ability to
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cross-subsidize. Tight payment systems reduce margins, thereby elim-
inating support for negative margin services, with the likely result that
negative cash return services will not be undertaken. Such a result
would be most unfortunate. It would necessitate either increased direct
financing by the public sector or reduced provision of services to society.
Given the political and financial constraints on the public sector, service
reductions are the most likely outcome.
A corollary to this argument is that if the NFP hospitals behave like
for-profits in their capital expenditure decision making in order to im-
prove financial performance, the same result will follow. By reducing the
social benefits they provide to society, NFPs will face the loss of favor-
able tax treatment, as perhaps they should. It is also likely that the
supply of equity financing would diminish (Smith, Wheeler, and Clem-
ent 1990). The challenge to nonprofit health care providers now and in
the future will be to achieve both their financial and nonfinancial
objectives.
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NOTES
1. Although FP firms may pursue objectives in addition to the wealth maximiza-
tion objective, the discipline of the equity market makes it infeasible to pursue
them at the expense of wealth maximization.
2. The economic theory underlying the concept of public goods is summarized
in Musgrave and Musgrave (1973).
3. For an excellent theoretical discussion of external benefits and the appropriate
public response in the health care context, see Pauly (1971).
4. By adopting Weisbrod’s (1977) social good model, we assume away other
motivations for donations, such as having the option of one’s own care if needed
in the future.
5. Weisbrod (1977), p. 2.
6. There is no formal investment model presented in Pauly (1986).
7. See Smith, Wheeler, and Clement (1990) for a theoretical presentation of the
return required by suppliers of NFP equity.
8. In any period, the total net present value of all projects adopted, plus unre-
stricted donations, may exceed or be less than zero. For capital to be preserved in
the long run, and for the firm to maximize the value of services provided to the
community, the NPV of all projects will sum to zero.
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9. Long (1976) was one of the first to conceptualize social outputs as community
dividends.
10. Quantification of in-kind dividends can be accomplished by several meth-
ods. One way, recommended for governmental programs, is in terms of the
improvements in health status that they produce. This approach requires the
development of quantitative measures of health improvements, such as reduc-
tions in mortality or morbidity or improvements in the quality of life of patients.
Torrance (1986) has detailed one technique for developing such a quantitative
measure of health outcome, called Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), which
is based on health state utilities. This approach also requires assignment of a
dollar value to the measure of the health status. Our view is that, although the
QALY method may be conceptually superior to other methods, in most cases it is
impractical for a single firm to estimate a quantitative measure of the health
effects of its proposed projects and to attach a dollar value to that measure in a
consistent and nonarbitrary manner.
11. Silvers and Kauer (1986) argue that it is inappropriate for NFP hospitals to
earn a return on retained earnings because donors are deprived of the tax bene-
fits from new donations. This conclusion, however, is inconsistent with their
analysis of the required rate of return in which the donor donates all of her tax
benefits to the NFP.
12. The approach is implicit in the arguments of Long (1976) and Silvers and
Kauer (1986).
13. Price reductions based on sliding fee scales or price discrimination are social
output choices made by the firm. The resulting lower prices should in general
not be used to estimate willingness to pay.
14. See note 11.
15. Some NFP firms pay self-liquidating dividends (Long 1982a, b) in the sense
that they consciously adopt projects which, taken together, result in negative
NPV. Some donors give to NFP firms with the expectation that these firms will
pay self-liquidating dividends.
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